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Abstract
Delineation of the relevant market forms a pivotal part of most an-
titrust cases. The standard approach is sequential. First the product mar-
ket is delineated, then the geographical market is defined. Demand and
supply substitution in both the product dimension and the geographical
dimension will normally be stronger than substitution in either dimension.
By ignoring this one might decide first to define products narrowly and
then to define the geographical extent narrowly ignoring the possibility of
a diagonal substitution. These reflections are important in the empirical
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to a sequential approach conclusions will be reversed.
JEL: C3, K21, L41, Q22
Keywords: Relevant market, econometric delineation, salmon.
∗We thank Tobias Købke of Copenhagen Economics ApS for excellent research assistance
and the Centre of Industrial Economics for financial support.
†Corresponding author: CBS, Solbjerg Plads 3, C5; DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark.
1
1 Introduction
Delineation of the relevant market constitutes a pivotal part of most antitrust
cases. The standard approach is sequential. First the product market is delin-
eated, then the geographical market is defined. However, demand and supply
substitution in both the product dimension and the geographical dimension will
normally be stronger than substitution in either dimension at a time. By ignor-
ing this, one might decide first to define products narrowly and then to define
geographical extent narrowly ignoring the possibility of diagonal substitution.
Price tests are frequently used in market delineation because detailed produc-
tion and sales data are inaccessible. Using a unique price data set, we demon-
strate that the sequential approach can reverse conclusions compared with a
more proper simultaneous approach to market definition. We use monthly ex-
port price data for farmed salmon produced in Norway and Scotland. Data
has been acquired from Norwegian Kontali and Eurostat’s Comext. All prices
are converted to the same currency and unit of account (Euros per kilo). The
sample runs from January 1995 through August 2003.
The excellent data for this market allow for the use of a number of diﬀer-
ent applications of modern time series econometrics that each corroborate the
conclusions. As a powerful tool in the analysis of joint market delineation we
suggest to employ the Johansen ML procedure for cointegrated systems which
takes advantage of an extended information set compared to a sequential pro-
cedure using univariate unit root tests, e.g. Dickey-Fuller tests, that do not use
co-variate information regarding other price series.
Our most important result is that contrary to what we find when using
a sequential approach, the simultaneous anaysis suggests that Norwegian and
Scottish salmon should be considered belonging to the same product market as
well as the same geographical market when looking at the sample period January
1995 through August 2002. The conclusion is that the sequential approach
should not be carried out when a simultaneous approach is feasible.
We also find that when EU regulation of Norwegian salmon prices (anti-
dumping duties or minimum prices) are binding as was the case in the twelve
months after our primary sample period then the market delineation changes
so that Norwegian and Scottish salmon belong to diﬀerent product and diﬀer-
ent geographical markets. The economic interpretation is that the regulatory
intervention removes the normal competive pressure of Norwegian salmon on
Scottish salmon so that divergent price paths are sustainable.
In the next section a review of the literature on market and product delin-
eation is given. This is followed, in section 3, by a thorough description of the
EU salmon industry with particular focus on farmed Norwegian and Scottish
salmon and the competition environment for these products. Section 4 suggests
an empirical methodology for simultaneous market delineation and the approach
is applied to the salmon price data set.
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2 Literature Review
Defining the relevant market is crucial in the application of competition poli-
cies concerning restrictive agreements, abuse of domination and merger control.
The purpose of defining the relevant market is to identify all substitutes that ex-
ert a significant competitive constraint on the product or service under scrutiny.
These may be subsitutes in demand or in supply. Demand substitution is carried
out by customers that seek alternatives; supply substitution is carried out by
suppliers that seek profit opportunities by shifting their supply towards higher
priced alternatives. Both types of substitution may have both a product di-
mension and a geographical dimension: Customers may look for a product with
diﬀerent characteristics or they may look for the same product but at a diﬀer-
ent location. Likewise, suppliers may start producing a product with alternative
characteristics or they may start supplying their existing product at a diﬀerent
location. The competitive constraint is exerted by both demand and supply
substitution in both the product dimension and the geographical dimension.
The most common method for delineating the relevant market is that of the
‘hypothetical monopolist’ also known as the SSNIP test.1 The question posed
by this test is if a hypothetical monopolist in control of the products or services
that constitute a candidate market could profitably increase the price by some
small amount, typically five or ten per cent. The relevant market is the smallest
set of products or services that satisfy this condition. In principle, what the
test is looking for is an estimate of the elasticity of the residual demand of
the hypothetical monopolist. Landes and Posner (1981) demonstrate that in
the case of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe producing a homogeneous
good, the absolute value of this residual demand elasticity, εdi , may be expressed
as:
εdi =
εdm
Si
+
εs(1− Si)
Si
(1)
where εdm is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of market demand, Si
is the market share of the (hypothetically) dominant firm i and εs is the price
elasticity of supply. The hypothetically dominant firm would then find it optimal
to exercise market power as expressed by the familiar Lerner index:
Li =
Pi −MCi
Pi
=
1
εdi
(2)
These two equations summarize that the market power or the pricing of the
hypothetically dominant firmmay be constrained by both customers’ availability
of alternatives and alternative suppliers’ readiness to supply more if the price
increases. There are many variations of these basic equations. Neven et al.
(1993) for example contains similar expressions for a hypothetical monopolist
operating in an oligopoly with diﬀerentiated products.
In the EU, the European Commission seems to adopt a particular version of
this methodology. In its Notice on market definition, the central definition of
1SSNIP = Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase of Price.
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the test is:
“The question to be answered is whether the parties’ customers
would switch to readily available substitutes or to suppliers located
elsewhere in response to an hypothetical small (in the range 5%-
10%), permanent relative price increase in the products and areas
being considered. If substitution would be enough to make the price
increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales, addi-
tional substitutes and areas are included in the relevant market.
This would be done until the set of products and geographic areas
is such that small, permanent increases in relative prices would be
profitable.” (European Commission, 1997, paragraph 17)
The SSNIP test is also endorsed in other jurisdictions, e.g. in the United
States (Merger Guidelines) and in the United Kingdom (Oﬃce of Fair Trading,
1999). However, this methodology is only very rarely used directly in practice.
In a recent survey of EU merger cases between 1990 and 2001, Copenhagen Eco-
nomics (2003) demonstrates that the SSNIP methodology is used as a frame-
work in only eleven per cent of the product definitions and in only four per cent
of the geographic delineations. The methodology is never applied directly in a
quantitative analysis. Instead the European Commission typically relies on very
simple indicators such as trade flows and diﬀerences in price levels as empirical
documentation for their choice of market definition.
The reason why the SSNIP methodology is applied only rarely and unsys-
tematically is probably that in order to estimate the components of (1) a lot of
data is needed (time series of quantities, prices and background variables).2 An
alternative that has been used, particularly in merger analysis, is price correla-
tion analysis, see Bishop and Walker (2002, ch. 11). The application of these
tests may be attributed to a more limited data requirements as only price data
series are needed. This methodology is based on Stigler and Sherwin (1985)
who argued that the (relevant) market should consist of those suppliers and
customers whose trading determine the price. They thus defined the market as
“the area within which the price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance being
made for transportation costs.”
Evidently, price correlations must be purged of common factors such as sea-
sonality in demand or price movements of a common input that have nothing
to do with competitive pressures.3 Thus at the very least market definition
based on price correlation analysis should be based on partial correlation coef-
ficients. In addition, if the price series are not stationary, modern methods of
co-integration and error-correction models are needed to deal with the analy-
sis of co-variation of prices and the tendency for prices to revert to a stable
relationship.4
2See la Cour and Møllgaard (2002) for an application of a SSNIP-like approach to market
delineation for cement.
3 See Copenhagen Economics (2003) for a survey of these methods.
4 See Wills (2002) for an example of a market delineation of salmon using stationarity tests
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Typically, when such analysis is undertaken at all, it is based on pairwise
comparisons of products or geographical locations. In the Nestlé/Perrier merger
case5 the European Commission needed to establish whether still bottled water,
sparkling bottled water and other soft drinks would belong to the same rele-
vant market. The delineation was resolved by examining a set of correlation
coeﬃcients that established high correlation between still and sparkling min-
eral water and low correlation between either of these and other soft drinks.
The market was thus defined as mineral (source) water; see Bishop and Walker
(2002, 11.12-14).
It is even more rare that more advanced methods, such as Granger causality
tests and co-integration analysis, are employed in European competition cases.6
However, Granger causality tests were used in the Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva
merger case7 to establish whether the US, the EU and Eastern Europe be-
longed to the same geographical market for seamless stainless steel tubes, in-
dicating that they were. Co-integration analysis has been used in e.g. the
Lonrho/Gencor 8 and in the CVC/Lenzing9 merger cases. In the former the
absence of co-integrating relationships was taken as an indication that the five
products (platinum, rhodium, palladium, gold and silver) belonged to separate
product markets. In the latter, the European Commission used an Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test to determine that since “relative prices do not revert to some
long-run equilibrium [... the] two products do not belong to the same relevant
markets.”
There is a sense in which the SSNIP methodology advocates sequentiality.
The SSNIP thought experiment often runs as follows: The starting point is some
good. You ask the question if that good is worth monopolizing. If the answer
is negative,10 you look at a neighbouring good (in the product dimension or in
the geographical dimension) and extend the monopolizing requirement to that
good. You continue in this way until the monopolizing requirement is satisfied.
Typically, however, there are several neighbouring goods along both dimen-
sions. It is not obvious that a sequential or step-wise approach will give the
same answer as one that uses the information that is given by the system of
competitive pressures. Neven et al. (1993) argue that the European Commis-
on the price of Scottish salmon relative to that of Norwegian salmon. See Haldrup (2003) for
a survey of traditional and moderne econometric methods applicable to market delineation.
5Case IV/M190 [1993] 4 Common Market Law Review M17; [1992] Oﬃcial Journal of the
European Communities L356/1.
6 See Bishop and Walker (2002) 15.10-11 for a survey on which the following is based.
7Case IV/M315 [1994] Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities L102/15.
8Case IV/M619 [1997] Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities L11/30.
9Case COMP/M2187 [2000].
10The answer may be negative simply because the good is already monopolized. This
is known as the ‘cellophane fallacy’, see Stocking and Mueller (1955). The ‘hypothetical
monopolist’ might in fact be a real monopolist and thus have set the monopolist price. It
would then obviously not be profitable to raise the price by whatever small but significant
non-transitory amount. Some argue (e.g. Posner, 2001, 150-152) that the test should not be
based on actual prices but on the (counter-factual) competitive prices.
This is evidently not an operational approach. We find that the relevant question for market
delineation is whether other products exert a competitive pressure at the actual price level.
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sion uses a sequential approach by first defining product markets and then only
later defining geographical markets. On theoretical grounds, they argue that
demand substitution may be underestimated by this approach, since the SSNIP
test may fail to be satisfied first in the product dimension and then in the geo-
graphical dimension. We will argue that this critique extends and generalizes.
First, it extends to supply substitution. Suppliers may often react more to
e.g. geographical price diﬀerences than consumers, e.g. when the good rep-
resents low value to the consumer that hence would not find it profitable to
overcome transportation costs while suppliers would find it profitable to ship
the goods in large quantities.
Second, the critique generalizes to any dimension of the market delineation.
Even if the market delination exercise is done only in one dimension, e.g. the
product dimension, we may end up with erroneous results if part of the infor-
mation set is ignored. This is because competitive pressures that operate in the
other dimensions, e.g. the geographic dimension or (if the good may be stored)
in the time dimension, are ignored so that the partial model is misspecified.
3 The market for salmon in the EU
This section describes the product and the market for (farmed) salmon in the
EU. In addition, a recent merger case in the UK highlights the fairly advanced
methods already applied for delineating the relevant market for salmon.
3.1 The product and the industry
Salmon may be farmed or caught in the wild. Farmed salmon is a relatively
recent phenomenon, dating back about a quarter of a century. Before 1975,
fresh salmon was only caught from wild stocks and considered a luxury product.
Today, wild salmon accounts for a negligible fraction of EU consumption and
will be ignored in the following exposition that focuses entirely on the market
for farmed salmon in the EU.
The major producers of Atlantic salmon are Norway (54% of production
volume), Scotland (17%), Chile (13%), Canada (8%), Faroe Islands (5%) and
Ireland (3%). During the decade from 1990 to 2000, Atlantic salmon production
more than tripled. All producing countries increased production, however the
production of Scotland, Chile and Canada grew more than that of Norway.
In recent years the farmed salmon industry has shown signs of concentra-
tion: major producers have taken advantage of economies of scale and increased
capacity utilisation. The salmon industry includes several vertical elements of
a supply chain:
1. breeding of the salmon,
2. primary processing (slaughtering and gutting),
3. secondary processing (e.g. filleting and smoking), and
4. retailing or exporting.
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The main battle fields of Norwegian and Scottish producers of farmed salmon
are England, France, The Netherlands, Germany and Spain. Norway exports a
lot to Denmark as well: Denmark serves as a hub for further distribution and
processing of Norwegian salmon, in the same way as England serves as a hub
for Irish and Scottish farmed salmon.
3.2 Barriers to competition
In the markets for farmed salmon, barriers to competition might include ad-
vertising, possibly contracts with retailers, transportation costs and regulatory
barriers in the form of antidumpng duties. All in all, however, these barriers
seem low relative to the fast growth of the markets.
Processors, wholesellers and retailers are relatively big and purportedly will-
ing to buy salmon from both countries. Advertising is used by producers: Nor-
wegian salmon is advertised as a healthy product. Scottish salmon is generally
marketed as a superior quality product and has e.g. been awarded the Label
Rouge in France. Thus Scottish producers attempt to diﬀerentiate their product
vertically above Norwegian salmon. Retailers sell some salmon products as own
brands.
Contracts are not widely used: Most trade is handled informally. However,
retailers seem to drive a movement towards increased use of longer-term con-
tracts but at present the market seems very flexible for all players.
Transportation is complicated but not overly expensive. Salmon requires
specialized treatment throughout the distribution chain, involving iced contain-
ers and refrigerated storage facilities. Transportation costs amount to about
four per cent of total costs to farmers and six per cent to processors.
In terms of regulatory barriers, the EU Commission found Norwegian pro-
ducers guilty of dumping in 1996. Price floors and export volume caps were
established for Norwegian producers. A punitive anti-dumping tax of three per
cent was applied to all Norwegian exports. However, this tax may be used to
finance marketing projects. Although Norwegian salmon is restricted by these
regulations, their impact have been minimal due to the overall market develop-
ment with increased volumes and prices. Prices have generally remained over
the floor. Very recently the market price of farmed salmon has dropped signifi-
cantly making the price floor binding.
3.3 A merger case in the salmon industry
The UK Competition Commission has recently (2000) investigated and reported
on the proposed acquisition by Nutreco Holding NV of Hydro Seafood GSP
Ltd from Norsk Hydro. Nutreco has substantial interest in fish feed and in
salmon production in Scotland, Chile and Canada but not in Norway or Ireland.
Norsk Hydro is Norway’s largest industrial group originating in oil and energy
production. Norsk Hydro did not regard its salmon farming businesses, Hydro
Seafood, as belonging to its core competencies.
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Nutreco’s Marine Harvest (Scotland; MH) and Hydro Seafood GSP (Norway;
GSP) are the two largest farmers and suppliers of farmed salmon in the UK.
They have seawater farms and gutting/packing facilities on the west coast of
Scotland and in the western isles and Shetland. GSP and MH also both have
freshwater facilities in Scotland for rearing smolts (juvenile salmon). Nutreco’s
Trouw is UK’s largest manufacturer of feeds for salmon and trout.
The UK Competition Commission found that the relevant market for salmon
is that for gutted farmed Atlantic salmon extending across all of the EEA:
Farmed salmon is imported from other European countries, mainly Norway,
competes with Scottish farmed salmon and is considered a substitute for Scot-
tish salmon by many secondary processors, wholesalers and retailers. Nutreco’s
post-merger share would be above 15 per cent of this broadly defined market.
The Competition Commission argued, however, that Scottish salmon due to
vertical product diﬀerentiation can command a modest premium in the UK and
some export markets and thus ended up defining the market as “a small market
segment for which Scottish salmon is a diﬀerentiated premium product within
the single, wider EEA market for farmed gutted salmon.” In this narrowly de-
fined market Nutreco’s share of the UK market for Scottish salmon would be
around 46 per cent.
The Competition Commission recommended prohibition of the merger be-
cause of the expected direct eﬀects on the feed market and its indirect eﬀect on
the salmon market: Nutreco’s share of the UK market for salmon feed would
increase substantially. The supply of salmon feed is concentrated with a three-
firm concentration ration above 90 per cent. Nutreco’s Trouw is one of the
three large suppliers of feed. Since the merged company was stipulated to buy
mainly from Trouw, the Competition Commission expected the other two big
feed suppliers to face increased unit costs following reduced capacity utiliza-
tions. This would lead to an even further increase of Trouw’s position and make
it the only competitive feed producer. Other salmon farmers would thus face
increased costs and “[a]s the costs of independent salmon farmers and smolt pro-
ducers increase, some will either become more dependent on Nutreco or go out
of business, thereby further consolidating Nutreco’s position.” (UK Competition
Commission, 2000, p. 4).
Lexecon analysed the market definition for gutted salmon in this merger
case. Based on weekly data from July 1997 through June 2000 relative prices
were analyzed using stationarity tests. Lexecon relied on a sequential procedure
according to which they first decided that Scottish salmon was part of the same
product market as Norwegian salmon (in the UK) and then decided that Scottish
salmon sold in the UK was part of a market including France and the rest of
Europe. Apparently this analysis was accepted by the Competition Commission
(Wills, 2000). Below we will argue that this sequential procedure may lead to
wrong conclusions.
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Figure 1: Log export prices of Norwegian and Scottish Salmon 1995:1-2003:8.
4 Econometric market delineation
4.1 Description of the data and some motivation for the
simultaneous analysis
The price data used for the analysis of the Salmon case are export prices (FOB)
for Norwegian and Scottish Salmon (Source: Norwegian Kontali, and Eurostat’s
Comext). For Norway data is available for most of the EU countries whilst
the Scottish prices only are available for a subgroup of countries. Due to these
limitations the present analysis includes the export prices for Germany, The
Netherlands, France and Spain for the period 1995:1 - 2003:8. However, because
there are indications in the data set that the market conditions have changed
recently, see the discussion in section 3.2, much of the analysis will be for the
reduced sample period 1995:1-2002:8. All prices have been converted to the
same currency and unit of account (Euros per kilo). In the statistical analyses
the log-transformed price series are examined.
Before any formal statistical analysis it is worthwhile considering some de-
scriptive and graphical measures of the available data. In figure 1 the (log)
export prices (henceforth: export prices) are displayed separately for Scottish
and Norwegian salmon to emphasize the product dimension. Visual inspection
of the figure seems to indicate diﬀerent time series properties. The Scottish
prices do seem to co-move to some extend, as is strongly the case for the Norwe-
gian prices. However, as compared to the Norwegian prices the Scottish prices
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tend to be somewhat more volatile. From a visual analysis one might argue
that the Scottish prices are stationary, I(0), whereas the Norwegian prices are
non-stationary I(1). If this conjecture is correct, i.e. the integration orders for
prices across the two products diﬀer, the market for Norwegian and Scottish
salmon are separate. Also, because the Norwegian prices seem to exhibit the
same stochastic price trend for all of the four countries, i.e. the prices seem to
cointegrate, see Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991), the geograph-
ical market for Norwegian salmon includes all four countries. Even though the
Scottish Salmon prices seem to co-vary in the four countries it is harder from
eye-balling to say how the relevant geographical market for Scottish salmon
should be delineated.
The above arguing relies on a sequential market delineation strategy. Sta-
tistical analyses of the integration orders of the individual price series do in fact
show that the above conjecture about the price behaviour is correct11. However,
we will demonstrate that the sequential approach can contain pitfalls which may
invalidate the conclusions. At least the statistical tools that are available to do
a powerful simultaneous analysis of the price series for both Norwegian and
Scottish salmon will provide a rather diﬀerent conclusion. Lets try to put forth
some explanations why this can occur.
First of all, the basic reasoning why the Scottish Salmon and Norwegian
Salmon, based on price tests, are to be regarded as diﬀerent products is that
the integration order of the price series are diﬀerent. If this finding is correct the
products cannot belong to the same market. It is a general time series property
that an I(1) series plus an I(0) series will always be I(1). However, for a finite
sample size it can be hard to discriminate between these cases because the
variance of the I(0) component can be arbitrarily big, see Franses and Haldrup
(1994). When this is the case any test will have diﬃculties detecting the true
(asymptotic) order of integration of the series and relates to the poor power
of unit root tests in many cases. In relation to the above data example our
argument is that even though the Scottish prices are more volatile than the
Norwegian prices the general level of the prices seem to co-vary, perhaps except
for the last year of observations. This could indicate that the Scottish and
Norwegian prices could share a common price trend. Some graphs will emphasize
this argument. In figure 2 the pairs of Norwegian and Scottish export prices
to the single countries are displayed after the series have been filtered using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter, see e.g. Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The idea is
to decompose the price series pt into the sum of a trend component τ t and an
irregular component ct = pt−τ t where the trend is found by solving the problem
min
τt
TX
t=1
((pt − τ t)2 + λ((τ t+1 − τ t)− (τ t − τ t−1))2)
where λ is a smoothing parameter.
11Both augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, see e.g. Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1979),
and KPSS tests, see Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) were conducted. For space limitations these
tests are not reported but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2: Hodrick-Prescott filtered (log) price trend for Scottish and Norwegian
salmon exported to France, The Netherlands, Germany, and Spain.
Figure 2 displays the trend component after filtration with λ = 5. Even
though the price trends of the Norwegian salmon are almost identical, it is
of interest to observe that for each of the countries the variation of the price
trends for Scottish and Norwegian salmon to each of the regions tend to co-vary,
especially for the 1995:1-2002:8 period. This co-variation is hard to observe using
the raw data due to the strong short-run fluctuations. So when attempting to
extract the price trends across the diﬀerent price series there does in fact seem to
exist a common price trend element although we realize that the above analysis
should be considered illustratory.
This result is interesting because it allows for the possibility that the entire
system of 8 prices (2 salmon products to 4 countries) is governed by a single price
trend, and when this is the case the product and geographical market is com-
mon for Norwegian and Scottish salmon. However, such an analysis necessarily
requires that the 8 price series are considered jointly. The testable implications
are thus to see whether the 8 price series are restricted by 7 cointegrating re-
strictions which implies that a single common stochastic price trend drives the
entire system of prices. A particularly interesting testable implication of a joint
product and geographical market is that the cointegrating relations appear in
pairs whereby the relative prices (up to a scale) are stationary across products
and across regions. According to Granger´s representation theorem, see Engle
and Granger (1987), cointegration amongst the series will imply that an error
correction mechanism exists implying Granger causality in at least one direc-
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tion which underscores the interaction of price behaviour. This is the property
that links together the common price pattern of the price series in the present
example. In the following section we will analyze these hypotheses by formal
testing.
4.2 Simultaneous delineation of the relevant product and
geographical markets
The starting point for the system analysis is a vector autoregressive model of
order k, VAR(k), for the levels of the price series:
Pt =m+A1Pt−1+A2Pt−2+.....AkPt−k+εt
where Pt = (p1t, p2t, ..., pqt)0 is the vector of price series and Ai are q × q
matrices with the parameters associated with each lag of the price series, and
m is a vector with the intercept terms of each equation. It is assumed that the
error term in the VAR model is normally distributed with a covariance matrix
Σ :
εt ∼ N(0,Σ)
The model can also be written on error correction model form, see Johansen
(1991), as
∆Pt =m+ΠPt−1 +
k−1X
j=1
Γj∆Pt−j + εt (3)
The cointegration properties of the data are given by conditions concerning
the matrix Π. Technically we have to address (and estimate) the rank of that
matrix. The following possibilities arise:
Rank Π = q (full rank) ⇒ Pt is stationary, I(0).
Rank Π = 0 (zero rank)⇒ ∆Pt is stationary, I(0), (or equivalently, Pt is I(1)).
Rank Π = r < q (reduced rank) ⇒ ΠPt−1 is stationary I(0).
In the third case there are r cointegrating relations and thus q − r separate
price trends. This case is obviously most interesting because this is the situation
where "attractor relations" exist between the price levels and hence aﬀect market
delineation. The empirical problem is thus initially to determine r. Assume
now, that the rank of Π equals r (0 < r < q). In this case
Π = αβ0
where α,β are both q × r.
This yields the error correction model formulation of the model in the case
of cointegration
∆Pt =m+αβ0Pt−1+
k−1X
j=1
Γj∆Pt−j+εt. (4)
12
It is important to observe that the number of cointegration relations mea-
sures the number of stationary relationships. In principle, this implies that the
order of integration of the single series can be tested within the cointegrated
VAR model, i.e. if the matrix β contains a column of zeros and a single cell
with a non-zero entry, then the associated variable is stationary I(0). This has
testable implications as we shall see.
With respect to the present application it is of interest to look at the fur-
ther requirements for market delineation along the product and geographical
dimensions, respectively. Let us look at the most interesting cases.
4.2.1 Case 1. Norwegian and Scottish salmon are considered sepa-
rate products and for each product there exist a geographical
market delineated by the number of countries under scrutiny.
Write the 8 dimensional price vector
Pt = (p1St, p2St, p3St, p4St, p1Nt, p2Nt, p3Nt, p4Nt)0 (5)
with i = 1, 2, 3, 4 indicating the country to which export takes place, and j =
N,S signifies Norwegian and Scottish salmon, respectively. If we assume that
the single price series are all I(1), then the cointegration rank is r = 6 in the
present case whereby the 8 price series are driven by 2 separate price trends:
one for each product. To further identify these trends the β matrix should take
the form
β =


1 0 0 0 0 0
∗ 1 0 0 0 0
0 ∗ 1 0 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 ∗ 1 0
0 0 0 0 ∗ 1
0 0 0 0 0 ∗


(6)
where "*" indicates an arbitray number. If it occurs that the freely varying pa-
rameters equal minus one, then the relative prices across the diﬀerent countries
will be stationary which can be tested. In this case we have
β0Pt =


p1St − p2St
p2St − p3St
p3St − p4St
p1Nt − p2Nt
p2Nt − p3Nt
p3Nt − p4Nt


(7)
i.e. the vector of stationary relative prices12.
12Observe that stationarity of the relative prices is not necessary for the associated prod-
ucts to belong to the same market. It is suﬃcient that the pair of price series cointegrate
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Note how the block structure in (6) indicates that Norwegian and Scottish
salmon are considered separate products, i.e. only the pairs of prices for each
of the goods are stationary.
The two goods can also be considered separate (in terms of product delin-
eation) when the integration orders of prices diﬀer. Assume the Scottish prices
are all I(0) and that Norwegian prices are all I(1). Also assume that the ge-
ographical market for Norwegian salmon is the "the group of four"-countries
considered in the study. In this situation the cointegration rank is r = 7 and
the single price trend drives the market for Norwegian salmon. Hence, the β
matrix takes the form
β =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 ∗ 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗


(8)
Whether this is a valid restriction of the cointegration matrix is again testable
of course. Note that in the present case the geographical market for Norwegian
salmon consists of the 4 countries. To analyze the geographical dimension for
Scottish salmon requires further testing relevant for stationary variables.
4.2.2 Case 2. Norwegian and Scottish salmon belong to the same
product and geographical market.
In this second case the cointegration rank is r = 7 and a single price trend drives
all 8 prices series, i.e. this price trend is common to all prices. The β−matrix
can for instance take the form
β =


1 0 0 0 0 0 1
∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 ∗ 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 ∗
0 0 0 ∗ 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 ∗ 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0


(9)
Compared to (6) the extra column implies that the block structure vanishes and
makes all prices across products pairwisely cointegrated. For instance, using
whereby the error correction mechanism following from the cointegration property will ensure
co-movement of the prices. If relative prices are stationary it is just a further restriction of
the model, but this will not have diﬀerent implications concerning marketdelineation.
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the normalization chosen in (9) the price pair (p1St, p1Nt ) cointegrates. In
fact, proper rearrangement will show that all pairs (piSt, piNt) for the countries
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 cointegrate in this case and because there are no over-identifying
restrictions in this structure it is not possible to do any testing. An alternative
way of specifying an exactly identified structure is
β =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ 1 0
0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ 1
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗


(10)
In this case the cointegrating relations are arranged such that the price pairs
for Norwegian and Scottish salmon to a particular region will cointegrate. Also
the price pairs of e.g. Norwegian salmon to the various regions cointegrate. In
fact, due to the exact identification several ways of arranging the pairwise prices
exist.
As it can be seen, product and geographical market delineation has testable
implications when the full system of price series is analyzed jointly. In the fol-
lowing section we will adopt the Johansen ML-procedure to test the possibilities
using the present data set.
4.3 Testing market delineation
For the price vector Pt given in (5) a VAR(2) model on the error correction
model form (3) was estimated for the period 1995:1-2002:8. A constant which
could be restricted to lie in the cointegration space was included which means
that no linear trends were allowed to exist in the data. This is what we would
also expect from visual inspection of the graphs in figure 1. The estimated VAR
model was generally found to be statistically well-specified although there were
some problems with the normality assumption associated with the export prices
to France of Norwegian Salmon, see Table 1. However, it is well known from
e.g. Gonzalo (1994) that cointegration analysis is robust to discrepancies from
the normality assumption.
In Table 2 the results of Johansen’s cointegrated VAR analysis are reported.
Using a conservative 10% level (which is reasonable given that the asymptotic
distributions may be poor in finite samples) there is clear sign of the presence
of r = 7 cointegration vectors which further implies that only a single common
price trend drives the data. According to the discussion in section 4.2 this is a
necessary requirement for Norwegian and Scottish salmon to belong to the same
product and geographical market. In figure 3 the "cointegrating relations" are
displayed and visual inspection of these reveal evidence that 7 relations are very
stationary whilst the 8th relation seems much more non-stationary.
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However, we need to impose further restrictions to conclude on market de-
lineation because diﬀerent possibilities exist.
Table 1. Specification testing of the VAR(2) model. The tests reported are LM tests for ARCH,
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. The JB test is the Jarque-Bera test for Normality.
AR(1-6) LM-test JB-χ2test ARCH-LM test White-LM test
Scottish Salmon
France .73 9.20∗∗ .52 .18
The Netherlands .74 3.50 .30 1.17
Germany .98 8.19∗∗ .56 1.25
Spain .95 4.93 .62 .70
Norwegian Salmon
France 1.00 27.08∗∗∗ .46 .23
The Netherlands .58 1.14 .83 .73
Germany 1.37 4.69 .66 .64
Spain .77 2.26 .25 .57
Note: "*", "**", and "***" indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Table 2. Johansen trace test for cointegration rank. The sample
period is 1995:1-2002:8.
rank r eigenvalue log-likelihood Trace-test: H0 : rank ≤
0 1144.99 244.76 [0.000]∗∗∗
1 .5165 1177.69 179.36 [0.000]∗∗∗
2 .4210 1202.28 130.18 [0.000]∗∗∗
3 .3862 1224.24 86.26 [0.007]∗∗∗
4 .2861 1239.41 55.92 [0.032]∗∗
5 .2190 1250.53 33.67 [0.071]∗
6 .1542 1258.07 18.60 [0.083]∗
7 .1305 1264.37 6.01 [0.197]
8 .0646 1267.37
First we consider the possibility of all Scottish prices being stationary. This
was the outcome when conducting univariate ADF and KPSS test of the single
price series. We imposed the restriction
β =


1 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 1 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 1 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗


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1995 2000
0.0
0.5
1.0 vector1 
1995 2000
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0 vector2 
1995 2000
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0 vector3 
1995 2000
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50 vector4 
1995 2000
-2.5
0.0
2.5 vector5 
1995 2000
-0.1
0.0
0.1 vector6 
1995 2000
-0.1
0.0
0.1
vector7 
1995 2000
0
1
vector8 
Figure 3: The cointegrating vectors. According to the Johansen ML trace test
the first 7 vectors are stationary whereas the 8th is non-stationary. Note the
diﬀerent scales.
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which is a joint test of all Scottish price series being stationary whilst leaving
the remaining stationary relations unaﬀected. This test gives 4 over-identifying
restrictions and the LR test is thus distributed as χ2(4) yielding a p-value of
0.002. Hence the hypothesis is rejected, thus reversing the conclusion drawn
from univariate (sequential) testing. One explanation behind this result is the
fact that an increased information set is used compared to the univariate tests
which increases test power.
Next, in order to see how much structure we can impose on the co-integrating
relations, we have considered whether the price series cointegrate in pairs. This
would correspond to the β matrix (9) where no overidentifying restrictions are
imposed. Any testing requires further restrictions. A test of whether all the
relative prices are pairwise stationary implies one over-identifying restriction on
each of the β-vectors; the LR test is thus distributed as χ2(7) with a p-value
of 0.008 which leads to rejection. However, loosening the restrictions yields the
following structure which could not be rejected:
β =


1 1 1 0 0 0 1
∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 −1
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0


The χ2(6) test yields a p-value of 0.112. This means that all but one relative
price tends to be stationary; the remaining relation is also stationary but it is
not given as a (1, -1) relation. However, it is important to stress that while these
restrictions give rise to easier intuition, they are not important for the market
delineation as such. It is suﬃcient that we have found that the price series do
in fact cointegrate in pairs whereby the error correction model representation
will ensure the price dynamics to be such that the prices tend to co-move which
is suﬃcient for the goods to belong to the same market.
The major strength of the simultaneous analysis is that the interaction of
prices across Norwegian and Scottish prices can be examined. To further em-
phasize the interaction of prices for these products we have have rearranged the
above system to focus on the relative price pairs for the products. To do so the
β matrix has been formulated such that the elements of β0Pt reads
β0Pt =


p1St − p1Nt
p2St − p2Nt
p3St − p3Nt
p4Nt − p4Nt
∗
∗
∗


(11)
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where we only want to focus on the first four cells for illustration. Note that these
price pairs in (11) measure respectively the relative prices of Norwegian and
Scottish salmon to each of the countries (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) France, The Netherlands,
Germany, and Spain. The loading matrix of these relative prices can be written
as follows according to the error correction model (4) (where the remaining
dynamics has been abstracted from):


∆p1St
∆p2St
∆p3St
∆p4Nt
∆p1Nt
∆p2Nt
∆p3Nt
∆p4Nt


=


−.74∗∗∗ 0 0 0
0 −.46∗∗∗ 0 0
0 0 −.56∗∗∗ 0
0 0 0 −.52∗∗∗
.06∗∗ 0 0 0
0 .04∗∗∗ 0 0
0 0 .02 0
0 0 0 .01




p1St−1 − p1Nt−1
p2St−1 − p2Nt−1
p3St−1 − p3Nt−1
p4Nt−1 − p4Nt−1
∗
∗
∗


.
It is apparent from the price dynamics that very strong adjustment of prices
takes place across the diﬀerent salmon products. For instance, when a unit
price diﬀerence exists between Norwegian and Scottish Salmon export to France,
then 74% of this discrepancy is eliminated in the following period with respect
to the Scottish salmon prices. The adjustment in Norwegian salmon prices is
somewhat weaker, i.e. only 6% of the discrepancy is subsequently corrected for.
In general, the Norwegian salmon prices seem to adjust somewhat less to the
Scottish salmon prices than opposite. But the conclusion is that as a result of
common price trends causal eﬀects exist across products and hence advocating
for a common product in market delineation.
4.4 On the robustness of the empirical results to the full
sample period
In the above empirical analysis we have limited the analysis to the data period
1995:1-2002:8. If we extend the sample to include the following twelve months
for which we know that the antidumping regulation of Norwegian salmon prices
has been binding, we find that our empirical market delineation results are not
robust to such an extension. From figure 1 it is apparent that the price behaviour
changes by the end of the sample period as discussed in section 3.2. Asche and
Steen (2003) show how these antidumping measures aﬀected Norwegian salmon
pricing behaviour that was detached from EU salmon producers’ behaviour.
A formal test of cointegration using the above techniques to the full sample
period yields the results reported in table 3
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Table 3. Johansen trace test for cointegration rank. The sample
period is 1995:1-2003:8.
rank r eigenvalue log-likelihood Trace-test: H0 : rank ≤
0 1277.70 225.79 [0.000]∗∗∗
1 .4629 1309.39 162.40 [0.000]∗∗∗
2 .3715 1333.08 115.02 [0.007]∗∗∗
3 .3044 1351.60 77.99 [0.040]∗∗
4 .2353 1365.27 50.64 [0.097]∗
5 .1981 1376.53 28.12 [0.239]
6 .1411 1384.30 12.59 [0.406]
7 .0755 1388.30 4.59 [0.343]
8 .0440 1390.59
The underlying model is based upon a VAR(2) and all but the normality
tests appear satisfactory. In fact, the normality tests deteriorate compared to
the reduced sample which is likely to be caused by outliers in the extended
observation period. For the eight price series the cointegration rank is found to
be 5 using a 10 % significance level. This is a rather low value and indicates that
Norwegian and Scottish salmon cannot be considered belonging to the same
product and geographical market. A test of whether the Norwegian salmon
prices cointegrate in pairs can also be rejected using a χ2(6) test which points
to a much more scattered picture with respect to market delineation given the
most recent price developments.
This shows that market delineation must take regulatory intervention in the
pricing decisions of firms very seriously. Empirical market delineation can be
sensitive to temporary, government-imposed deviations from the market con-
ditions that would otherwise exist. Unfettered market behaviour for a given
period is needed to support conclusions regarding the relevant geographical and
product delineation. In other words, regulation such as antidumping duties or
minimum prices may remove the competitive pressure from a certain product or
geographical location thus possibly reducing the extent of the relevant market.
5 Conclusions
A simultaneous strategy for product and geographical market delineation has
been proposed and it was demonstrated how results may diﬀer from sequen-
tial delineation, indicating that the sequential method may lead to spuriously
narrow markets. A sequential market delineation strategy where the product
market is delineated prior to geographical market delineation will typically be
based on a limited information set as compared to a joint market delineation.
The sequential strategy suggests that for the sample period 1995:1-2002:8 Nor-
wegian and Scottish salmon are separate products and for each product France,
Spain and Holland belong to the same geographical market. The simultaneous
delineation suggests that Norwegian and Scottish salmon are to be considered
belonging to the same product market as well as the same geographical market.
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In addition, we showed that regulatory intervention in a part of the relevant
market may reduce the extent of the market since it reduces or eliminates a part
of the competitive pressure.
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